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NOTES
THE USE OF RULE 37(b) SANCTIONS TO ENFORCE
JURISDICTIONAL DISCOVERY
INTRODUCTION
The discovery systemI outlined in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure 2 was designed to facilitate arriving at the merits of legal dis-
putes3 by providing for the fullest possible disclosure of all relevant
facts. 4 Discovery rules have been employed tactically, however, to
obstruct the judicial process. 5 These abuses frustrate the goal of the
1. Discovery is the process by which a party obtains information and other
materials relevant to a pending lawsuit. Developments in the Law-Discovery. 74
Harv. L. Rev. 940, 942 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. From a practical
standpoint, the discovery process provides for the economical use of judicial re-
sources. Id. It eliminates the risk of surprise at trial, reduces the number of con-
troverted issues for which proof must be taken and increases the possibility of pre-
trial settlement. Id. In addition, by bringing about disclosure and presentation of
relevant evidence, it exposes fraudulent and groundless claims, thereby leading to
judgments more consonant with the weight of the evidence. Id. at 944.
2. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
3. Civil procedure in the federal courts was "in a state of chaos" prior to the
formulation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Holtzoff, Origin and Sources of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1057, 1057 (1955). There
were numerous categories of procedure and various kinds of pleading. Id., see R.
Millar, Civil Procedure of the Trial Court in Historical Perspective 57-64 (1952).
The authors of the Federal Rules intended to create a uniform set of procedural rules
that would facilitate arriving at the merits of legal disputes and diminish the possibil-
ity of procedural defaults, Holtzoff, supra, at 1059; Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectu-
ate Pretrial Discovery, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 480, 480 (1958); Address by Chief Justice
Hughes, American Law Institute Meeting (May 9, 1935), 12 A.L.I. Proc. 57 (1935).
4. E.g., United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958);
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 507 (1947); Harlem River Consumers Coop.,
Inc. v. Associated Grocers, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 551, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Rule 26(b)(1)
provides that "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the . . . action . . . . It is not
ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial If
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The theory underlying the discover)
system is that a broad pre-trial inquiry into the facts results in a greater measure of
justice at trial by "transforming the sporting trial-by-surprise into a more reasoned
search for truth." Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures
Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1063 (2d Cir. 1979); accord Armstrong, Report of the Advi-
sory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Recommending Amendments, 5
F.R.D. 339, 353 (1946); Kaminsky, Proposed Federal Discovery Rules for Comphx
Civil Litigation, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 907, 908 (1980).
5. Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1212-13 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 512 and 102 S. Ct. 641 (1981). Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d
231, 235-36 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Kaminsky, supra note 4, at 909-10; Speck, The Use of
RULE 37(b) DISCOVERY SANCTIONS
Federal Rules "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion of every action."' 6 One such abuse of the discovery process occurs
when a defendant challenges the court's jurisdiction over himr and
then fails to cooperate in discovery directed toward that issue."
Because jurisdictional facts are often known to the defendant and
unknown to the plaintiff, 9 the defendant may attempt to avoid the
jurisdiction of the court by concealing evidence regarding his acti~'ties
in the forum.10 The Federal Rules authorize the court, however, to
order a defendant to respond to discovery" directed toward any
matter related to a defense.' 2 A claim that the court lacks personal
Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 Yale L.J. 1132, 1132-33 (1951). The
mechanisms outlined in the discovery rules have been employed to delay litigation.
ACF Indus., Inc. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, 1086-88 (1979) (Powell, Stewart &
Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting from denial of cert.): Note, The Emerging Deterrence
Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1033, 1033
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Deterrence]. Abuses of these mechanisms have also
operated to limit access to the courts by making the costs of litigation prohibitive to
all but those with deep pockets. Amendments to Fed. R. Civ. P., 85 F.R.D. 521, 520-
23 (1980) (Powell, Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting from adoption): Renfrew,
Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 Calif. L. Rev. 264, 264-65 (1979).
6. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell,
J., concurring); Ohio v. Crofters, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 12, 15 (D. Colo. 1977), affd in
relevant part sub nom. Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); see Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D. -A Need for
Systematic Anticipation, Address to the National Conference on the Causes of Popu-
lar Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 83, 95-96 (1976).
7. This challenge is made by entering a motion to dismiss under rule 12(b)(2),
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), or by interposing an objection to personal jurisdiction in the
responsive pleadings. 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure §
1351, at 564 (1969).
8. See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d
877, 881-83 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981): Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil,
S.A., 629 F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981);
English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d 723, 726-27 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 832 (1979); Lekkas v. Liberian M/V Caledonia, 443 F.2d 10, 11 n.1 (4th Cir.
1971) (per curiam).
9. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d
877, 885 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nora. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981): Note, The Use of Discovery to Obtain
Jurisdictional Facts, 59 Va. L. Rev. 533, 541 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Jurisdic-
tional Facts].
10. See Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d 1134, 1138-39 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981): English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590
F.2d 723, 728 n.5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979).
11. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a). The discovery process is usually set in motion by the
parties themselves. Deterrence, supra note 5, at 1035-36. If the party from whom
discovery is sought fails to respond adequately to the discovery request, the party
seeking discovery may move for a court order to compel a response. Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(a); Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 487. If the court finds that the discovery sought is
relevant to the subject matter of the action, unprivileged and not overly burdensome,
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b), it will order the dilatory party to respond under rule 37(a).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
12. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
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jurisdiction is such a defense.13 If a defendant fails to respond to a
discovery order, the court is authorized by rule 37(b) of the Federal
Rules to impose sanctions against him.14 When the information with-
held is relevant to the jurisdictional issue, the question arises whether
it is appropriate for the court to apply the issue-preclusive sanction of
establishing jurisdictional facts as true 15 or the outcome-determinative
sanction of entering a default judgment on the issue of liability.' 0
13. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). Discovery directed toward eliciting facts relevant to
this defense is appropriate. Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351
n.13 (1978); Jurisdictional Facts, supra note 9, at 544. Courts have the power,
therefore, under rule 37(a), to issue orders compelling that discovery. Familia de
Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
451 U.S. 1008 (1981); English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d 723, 727-28 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480
F. Supp. 1138, 1151 (N.D. I1l. 1979).
14. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2). This rule states in relevant part: "If a party
...fails to obey an order ...made under subdivision (a) of this rule . . . the court
in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as are
just, and among others the following: (A) An order that the matters regarding which
the order was made or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for
the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the
order; (B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated mat-
ters in evidence; (C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying
further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding
or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient
party; (D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order
treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders .... " Id. These
sanctions are pivotal to the effective functioning of the Federal Rules, Ohio v. Arthur
Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370, 1376 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978):
Rosenberg, supra note 3, at 497, and of the discovery process in particular. They
serve to compel compliance with discovery orders, United States v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 651-52 (9th Cir. 1981); Vac-Air, Inc. v. John Mohr &
Sons, 471 F.2d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1973), to remedy specific instances of noncompli-
ance with such orders, see Jones v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 602 F.2d 94, 97 (5th
Cir. 1979); Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 503-05 & n.23 (4th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978), and to prevent a party from benefit-
ing by withholding information sought through discovery. Cine Forty-Second St.
Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 1979):
General Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290, 308 (S.D. Cal. 1981). In
addition, the sanctions outlined in rule 37(b) are used to punish noncompliance and
to deter potential noncompliance with discovery orders, Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1980); National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey
Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 64, (1976) (per curiam), and to vindicate the authority of
the court. EEOC v. Kenosha Unified School Dist. No. 1, 620 F.2d 1220, 1226 (7th
Cir. 1980); Perry v. Golub, 74 F.R.D. 360, 365 (N.D. Ala. 1976).
15. See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.22d
877, 885 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981); English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d
723, 728 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Lekkas v. Liberian M/V
Caledonia, 443 F.2d 10, 11 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A);
4A J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 37.03[2.-3], at 37-66 (2d ed. 1981).
16. Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d 1134, 1136 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981); see Lekkas v. Liberian M/V Caledonia,
443 F.2d 10, 11 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).
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RULE 37(b) DISCO VERY SANCTIONS
The defendant may assert that in utilizing either of these rule 37(b)
sanctions, the court has in essence created its own jurisdiction.,- In
order to be valid, exercise of jurisdiction over a non-consenting party"t
must be authorized by Congress.'9 Such authorization can be found
in federal statutes or in the Federal Rules,20 which are promulgated
pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act. 2' Rule 4 of the Federal Rules,2 -
the principal mechanism by which federal courts exercise their juris-
diction, 23 authorizes a district court to assert personal jurisdiction in
accordance with the laws of the state in which the district court is
located, 2 4 or when otherwise authorized by the rules25 or federal
17. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d
877, 892 n.4 (3d Cir.) (Gibbons, J., dissenting in part), cert. granted vub non.
Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981);
Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d 1134. 1138-39 (5th Cir. 1980).
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981): English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d 723, 725
(8th Cir.), cert. denied. 444 U.S. 832 (1979): Jurisdictional Facts. supra note 9, at
547; cf. Aetna Business Credit, Inc. v. Universal Decor & Interior Design, Inc., 635
F.2d 434, 435 (5th Cir. 1981) (no showing of proper service).
18. If a party has consented to jurisdiction, assertion of the court's power over
him need not be authorized by rule or statute. 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Tupra note 7,
§ 1062, at 202, see, e.g.. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp.. 443 U.S. 173, 18) (1979)
(dictum) (consent by waiver): Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938) (consent
by bringing suit); Hess v. Pawloski. 274 U.S. 352. 356 (1927) (statutory consent
implied from use of state's highways).
19. The Constitution empowers Congress to provide for federal courts, U.S.
Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 ("Congress shall have Power . .. [t]o constitute Tribunals
inferior to the supreme Court"): id. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power ... shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish."). This power, supplemented by Congress' article I
power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying [it] into
Execution," id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, extends to the prescription of procedural rules,
including jurisdictional rules, which govern the workings of those courts. Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965): Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182. 187 (1943): see
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1. 22 (182.5).
20. Foster, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Federal Courts, 1969 \Wis. L. Rev. 9, 11:
see Washington v. Norton Mfg., Inc., 588 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 942 (1979).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). The Rules Enabling Act provides: "'[T]he Supreme
Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of process, writs,
pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts .... "
Id. The rules promulgated under this statute have the force of statutes. Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 13 (1941): see Ely, The Irrepressible M\Iyth of Erie, 87
Harv. L. Rev. 693, 718 n.134 (1974).
22. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)-(f).
23. Foster, supra note 20, at 11.
24. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e), which reads in part: "Whenever a statute or rule of
court of the state in which the district court is held provides (1) for service ... upon
a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state ... service may . . . be made
under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule." Id.
This provision was intended to encompass state process law as an alternative device
for authorizing the exercise of personal jurisdiction in the district courts. Id. advisory
comm. note (1963 amendment); Kaplan, Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 1961-1963 (1), 77 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 619-23 (1964).
25. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f), which reads in part: "'[P]rocess . .. may be served
anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court is held,
1982]
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statutes. 26 If the record is devoid of facts necessary to support jurisdic-
tion under rule 4, the defendant will object that entry of a rule 37(b)
sanction is an invalid exercise of jurisdiction.2 7  In addition, the Rules
Enabling Act requires that the rules promulgated under it not
"abridge, enlarge or modify [the] substantive right[s]" of litigants. 21
If application of a rule 37(b) sanction in a diversity action makes it
possible for a federal court to hear an action that the state court could
not, the defendant will claim that his substantive rights have been
affected, in violation of the Rules Enabling Act. 29
and, when authorized . . . by these rules, beyond the territorial limits of that state."
Id. The first provision of this rule was devised "so as to permit service of process
anywhere within a state in which the district court issuing the process is held and
where the state embraces two or more districts." Mississippi Publishing Corp. v.
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946). Federal standards measure a defendant's ame-
nability to process served pursuant to this provision. See, e.g., Fraley v. Chesapeake
& 0. Ry., 397 F.2d 1, 4 (3d Cir. 1968); Volkswagen Interamericana, S.A. v.
Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437, 440 n.3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 919 (1966): Lone
Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 212 F.2d 147, 153-54 (5th Cir. 1954).
The second provision, which refers to the rules, was designed "to assure the effective-
ness of service outside the territorial limits of the State in all the cases in which any of
the rules authorize service beyond those boundaries." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f) advisory
comm. note (1963 amendment).
26. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f), which reads in part: "[P]rocess . . . may be
served . . . when authorized by a statute of the United States . . . beyond the terri-
torial limits of [the] state." Id. This provision recognizes that Congress has authorized
use of federal jurisdictional standards under certain circumstances by enacting fed-
eral statutes with service of process provisions. 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 7,
§ 1125, at 522-23; Foster, supra note 20, at 21; see, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1976) (service
authorized in any district in which the adverse party may be found in actions to
confirm arbitration awards under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14
(1976)); 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1976) (service authorized on third parties in any district in
actions by the United States under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-40 (1976)): 15
U.S.C. §§ 77v(a), 78aa (1976) (service authorized wherever the defendant can be
found in actions under the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976), and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976)).
27. See Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d 1134, 1138, 1139
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981). The law is unclear with regard to
the power of federal courts to sanction discovery failures when subject matter juris-
diction is lacking. Recently the District of Columbia Circuit reversed a lower court
judgment, finding that the district court had erred in assuming that a challenge to
subject matter jurisdiction precluded the consideration of discovery sanctions. Ilan-
Cat Eng'rs, Ltd. v. Antigua Int'l Bank, 659 F.2d 234, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The
court concluded that, with the possible exception of a default judgment, whatever
sanctions are appropriate should be imposed regardless of the merits of the defen-
dant's challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Other courts have
suggested, however, that discovery sanctions are inappropriate in the absence of
subject matter jurisdiction. Mandel v. United States, 191 F.2d 164, 165-66 & n.6 (3d
Cir. 1951), aff'd sub nom. Johansen v. United States. 343 U.S. 427 (1952), Bell v.
United States, 31 F.R.D. 32, 36 (D. Kan. 1962); 4A J. Moore, supra note 15,
37.03[2], at 37-72.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
29. See Rowe, Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Poten-
tial for Further Reforms, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 963, 1005-06 (1979); cf. Goldberg, The
Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal Jurisdiction, 28 Stan. L. Rev. 395, 434
n.224 (1976) (when party not subject to state court's jurisdiction served pursuant to
RULE 37(b) DISCOVERY SANCTIONS
Exercise of jurisdiction by a court must also be consistent with the
jurisdictional limitations of due process.30  Due process requires that
the relationship between the defendant and the forum be sufficient to
justify the court's exercise of jurisdiction.3 ' If the record does not
disclose sufficient contacts with the forum, the defendant will assert
that imposition of a rule 37(b) sanction violates due process.32
If rule 37(b) sanctions cannot be used to compel jurisdictional
discovery, the district judge will be left in "a quandary in trying to
enforce his discovery order," 33 and the plaintiff may be deprived of his
only means of establishing his right to have the action heard in that
forum.3 4 Moreover, unless an alternative forum where sufficient ju-
risdictional facts are accessible to him is available, the plaintiff may
be denied the right to be heard altogether. 35 This Note contends that
federal courts have the power to enforce jurisdictional discover' with
bulge service provision of rule 4(f). his substantive rights are affected): Note, The
Limits of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction Under Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 48 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 268. 285 (1980) (same) [hereinafter cited as
Federal Rule 4(f)].
30. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980); 4 C.
Wright & A. Miller, supra note 7, § 1064, at 205-06; see Restatement (Second) of
Judgements § 7 comment b (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
31. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286. 291-92 11980).
32. Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d 1134, 1138-39 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied. 451 U.S. 1008 (1981); see Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v.
Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 892 n.5 (3d Cir.) (Gibbons, J., dissenting in
part), cert. granted sub nora. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981); English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d 723, 728 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); cf. Aetna Business Credit, Inc. v. Universal
Decor & Interior Design, Inc., 635 F.2d 434, 435 (5th Cir. 1981) (record did not
reflect that valid service had been made).
33. Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d 1134, 1139 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981).
34. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d
877, 891-92 (3d Cir.) (Gibbons, J., dissenting in part), cert. granted sub non.
Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981):
see Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981). If the defendant challenges a court's jurisdiction
over him, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists. See, e.g.,
Forsythe v. Overmyer, 576 F.2d 779, 781 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 64
(1978); Black v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 683 n.3 (5th Cir. 1977); Marshall
Exports, Inc. v. Phillips, 507 F.2d 47, 49 (4th Cir. 1974).
35. Unless the plaintiff can meet his burden of proof of jurisdiction, he will be
unable to have the merits of the action heard over the defendant's jurisdictional
objections. See 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 7, § 1351, at 567. The issue of
personal jurisdiction, which determines the court's power to exercise control over the
parties, is usually decided before other matters are reached. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 180 (1979); see Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v.
Global Moving & Storage, Inc., 533 F.2d 320, 323 (6th Cir. 1976); Pacific Inter-
mountain Express Co. v. Hawaii Plastics Corp., 528 F.2d 911, 912 (3d Cir. 1976)
(per curiam).
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the rule 37(b) sanctions. It first shows that when a defendant enters a
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and then fails to
respond to discovery relevant to the determination of that motion, he
waives his objections to the court's use of rule 37(b). It is then sug-
gested that application of these sanctions to enforce jurisdictional
discovery is contemplated by the Federal Rules and consistent with
the jurisdictional limitations of due process. Finally, this Note con-
cludes that the issue-preclusive sanction of establishing jurisdictional
facts is preferable to either the contempt or default judgment sanc-
tions authorized by rule 37(b). This sanction is an effective means of
remedying jurisdictional discovery failures and, unlike the default
judgment sanction, it does not defeat the primary goal of the Federal
Rules to provide for the resolution of disputes on their merits, rather
than on the basis of procedural defaults.
I. PROm= OF IMPOSING RULE 37(b) SANCrIONS
A. Waiver
When facts necessary to support jurisdiction are not apparent, a
defendant is likely to assert the defense that the court lacks jurisdiction
over him. 36  The plaintiff is entitled to seek discovery relating to this
defense. 37 If the defendant fails to respond to this discovery, the court
may find it necessary to employ one of the sanctions outlined in rule
37(b) to compel the defendant to produce the requested informa-
tion. 38  The defendant will object, however, that because the jurisdic-
tional issue has not yet been resolved, the court lacks power to impose
such a sanction. 39 Although a party does not waive his jurisdictional
objections when he appears for the purpose of raising those objec-
tions, 40 he does waive his objections to the court's authority to rule on
36. See, e.g., Washington v. Norton Mfg., Inc., 588 F.2d 441, 443, 445 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942 (1979); Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Tech. Assocs.,
557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977).
37. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
38. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d
877, 883 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnic des
Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981); English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d
723, 728 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); see Lekkas v. Liberian M/V
Caledonia, 443 F.2d 10, 11 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); 4A J. Moore, supra note 15,
37.03[2.-3], at 37-66; cf. Smith v. American Shipbldg. Co., 22 Fed. R. Serv.2d
(Callaghan) 831, 831-32 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (procedural prerequisites to class action
certification established when defendant failed to respond to interrogatories).
39. See Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d 1134, 1137-38 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981); English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590
F.2d 723, 727 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Read v. Ulmer, 308 F.2d
915, 917 (5th Cir. 1962) (dictum); cf. Aetna Business Credit, Inc. v. Universal Decor
& Interior Design, Inc., 635 F.2d 434, 435 (5th Cir. 1981) (final judgment improper
when there has been no showing of proper service).
40. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1).
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the jurisdictional issue. 4' Necessarily, he must also be treated as
having waived his objections to the court's authority to issue 42 and
enforce 43 orders essential to that determination, including orders to
produce information relevant to the issues raised by his motion. 44
The defendant cannot appear, ask the court to act substantively on his
behalf, and then challenge the court's authority when the court fails
to act in his favor. 45  By entering a motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, the defendant seeks the benefit of the court's
protection by asking the court to issue a binding ruling4' that he does
41. See Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1938); Atlantic Las Olas, Inc. v.
Joyner, 466 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied. 409 U.S. 1127 (1973):
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1151 (N.D. I11.
1979); cf. Grammenos v. Lemos, 457 F.2d 1067, 1070 (2d Cir. 1972) (waiver of
objections to court's authority to rule on merits by making general appearance to
contest merits); Thompson v. United States, 312 F.2d 516, 519-20 (10th Cir. 1962)
(waiver of objections to court's authority to rule on merits by moving for summary
judgment), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 912 (1963): Savas v. Maria Trading Corp., 285
F.2d 336, 341 (4th Cir. 1960) (waiver of objections to court's authority to rule on
merits by appearing to secure relief from personal liability).
42. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1151
(N.D. Ill. 1979); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a) advisor' comm. note (1970 amendment);
Jurisdictional Facts, supra note 9, at 549.
43. In order to enforce a party's obligation, a court must have the ordinary
judicial mechanisms available to it. Silk v. Sieling. 7 F.R.D. 576, 577 (E.D. Pa.
1947). The court has "inherent power" to employ these mechanisms when their use is
necessary to the exercise of another power. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S.
752, 764 (1980) (dictum); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34, 7 Cranch 21, 22-
23 (1812). Inherent power is defined as that power which "' [is] necessary to the
exercise of all others,' " Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980),
and has been characterized as "governed . . . by the control necessarily vested in
courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of cases." Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962). This
"inherent power" has been incorporated into the Federal Rules in rule 37(b), River-
side Memorial Mausoleum, Inc. v. Sonnenblick-Goldman Corp., 80 F.R.D. 433, 436
(E.D. Pa. 1978), which outlines rational mechanisms for enforcing court-ordered
discovery. Note, Standards for Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 27 Me. L. Rev.
247, 264 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Standards].
44. See Lekkas v. Liberian M/V Caledonia, 443 F.2d 10, 11 (4th Cir. 1971) (per
curiam); Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. Houdry Process Corp., 22 F.R.D. 306, 308
(D.P.R. 1958); Greene v. Oster, 20 F.R.D. 198, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Silk v. Siding,
7 F.R.D. 576, 577 (E.D. Pa. 1947). The very fact that the defendant is a party upon
whom discovery requests have been served gives rise to an obligation to provide the
information sought. See Trane Co. v. Klutznick, 87 F.R.D. 473, 476 (W.D. Wis.
1980).
45. Grammenos v. Lemos, 457 F.2d 1067, 1070 (2d Cir. 1972) (dictum); Alger v.
Hayes, 452 F.2d 841, 844-45 (8th Cir. 1972); Wyrough & Loser, Inc. v. Pelmor
Laboratories, Inc., 376 F.2d 543, 547 (3d Cir. 1967); Savas v. Maria Trading Corp.,
285 F.2d 336, 341 (4th Cir. 1960); see Backo v. Local 281, United Bhd. of Carpenters
& Joiners, 308 F. Supp. 172, 176 (N.D.N.Y. 1969), a~f'd, 438 F.2d 176 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
46. After a federal court has decided the question of jurisdiction over the parties
as a contested issue, the court in which the plea of res judicata is made does not have
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not have to defend the action in that forum. 47 If the motion is denied,
the defendant will still have the opportunity to argue the merits of his
case.
48
The defendant has the option of not appearing at all. 40 If he
exercises this option, the court will enter a default judgment against
him on the issue of liability. 50 The defendant can, however, collater-
ally challenge execution of that judgment on jurisdictional grounds.5'
His home forum is more likely to be sympathetic to his interests than
the forum where the action was brought. 52 A collateral challenge,
therefore, may prove more advantageous to the defendant than a
challenge in the forum in which the action was brought. If, despite
the power to inquire again into that issue. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 113-14
(1963); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1948), Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S.
165, 172 (1938); Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525-26
(1931).
47. See Read v. Ulmer, 308 F.2d 915, 917 (5th Cir. 1962) (dictum); Hicks v.
Holland, 235 F.2d 183, 183 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 855 (1956): Orange
Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 139 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 322 U.S. 740 (1944); Bogar v. Ujlaki, 4 F.R.D. 352, 353 (W.D. Pa. 19,15): 5
C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 7, § 1351, at 567. A dismissal for lack of personal
jurisdiction does not prejudice the right of the plaintiff to file another complaint on
the same claim in a forum where the court will be able to obtain jurisdiction. Orange
Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 139 F.2d 871, 875 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 322 U.S. 740 (1944); see Thomas v. Furness (Pac.) Ltd., 171 F.2d 434, 435
(9th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 960 (1949).
48. Vozeh v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 84 F.R.D. 143, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), Speir
v. Robert C. Herd & Co., 189 F. Supp. 436, 438 (D. Md. 1960): 5 C. Wright & A.
Miller, supra note 7, § 1351, at 568.
49. Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931).
50. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a), (b)(1). The defendant by his default is treated as
having admitted the' plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact and is bound to the
same extent as if he had appeared in the suit and contested the allegations of the
complaint. E.g., Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 112-14 (1885): Danning v.
Lavine, 572 F.2d 1;386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1978); Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston
Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975).
51. E.g., Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 62 (1938); Baldwin v. Iowa State
Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931); Covington Indus. v. Resintex A.C.,
629 F.2d 730, 732 (2d Cir. 1980); Hazen Research, [ne. v. Omega Minerals, Inc.,
497 F.2d 151, 154 (5th Cir. 1974); Ellington, Unraveling Waiver by Default, 12 Ga.
L. Rev. 181, 184 n.19 (1978). The waiver of jurisdictional objections mandated by
rule 12(h) becomes effective only when the defendant appears and fails to object to
the court's exercise of jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1). By failing to appear,
however, the defendant loses his right to challenge the court's ruling on the merits of
the action. -Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940); Simmons v. Saul, 138 U.S.
439, 448 (1891). If jurisdiction is upheld collaterally, therefore, he will be bound by
the adjudicating court's judgment. Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545, 550-51 (19,17):
Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 225 (1829).
52. The tendency of a forum to be biased towards its own residents was recog-
nized by the framers of the Constitution. See Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9
U.S. 61, 87, 5 Cranch 37, 50 (1809); Note, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdic-
tion, 41 Harv. L. Rev. 483, 510 (1928).
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this advantage, the defendant decides to appear, it may be inferred
that he has weighed his options and decided that appearance is the
more beneficial course of action.5 3 It is therefore not unfair to treat
the defendant as having waived his objections to the cotirt's authority
to employ rule 37(b) to enforce his obligation to produce information
relevant to determination of the issue he has raised.
Although the defendant's appearance does not of itself constitute a
waiver of his jurisdictional objections,55 his subsequent failure to re-
spond to discovery can amount to such a waiver.5 6 In Hammond
Packing Co. v. Arkansas,57 the Supreme Court recognized the "right
of the lawmaking power to create . . . the presumption that refusal to
produce evidence material to the administration of due process was
but an admission of the want of merit in the asserted defense."' 5 The
53. See Brief for Cross-Respondent at 41, Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981). If the defendant has assets within the
jurisdiction in which the action is brought, the default judgment rendered for his
failure to appear can be levied directly on those assets. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186, 210 (1977); von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Sug-
gested Analysis, 79 Harv. L. Rev. 1121, 1126-27 (1966). The defendant will not have
the opportunity, therefore, to challenge the court's exercise of jurisdiction over him in
his home forum. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. He does, however, still
benefit by exercising his option to appear. In doing so, he preserves his defenses on
the merits of the claim, see supra note 48 and accompanying text, and places the
plaintiff in the position of proving that the court has jurisdiction over him. See supra
note 34. If the defendant waits until the judgment is entered, his only means of
preventing its execution on his assets will be by moving to vacate for lack of personal
jurisdiction under rule 60(b)(4). Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4); see Thos. P. Gonzelez
Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Producion de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247, 1256 (9th
Cir. 1980). He will then bear the burden of proving lack of jurisdiction, Jones v.
Jones, 217 F.2d 239, 242 (7th Cir. 1954): Ellington, supra note 51, at 184, and will
not have an opportunity to contest the merits of the claim. See supra note 51.
54. Cf. Savas v. Maria Trading Corp., 285 F.2d 336, 341 (4th Cir. 1960) (de-
fendant should not be heard to say that court has the power to decide in his favor but
no power to rule against him); Marquest Medical Prods., Inc. '. Emde Corp., 496 F.
Supp. 1242, 1246 (D. Colo. 1980) (defendant cannot "walk away" from court's
jurisdiction having once submitted himself for the presumed advantages that he
obtained).
55. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
56. English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d 723, 728 n.5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 832 (1979). A court has the power to treat a party as having waived his
jurisdictional objections if it finds that the actions of the party constitute a waiver of
those objections. E.g., Hays v. United Fireworks Mfg. Co., 420 F.2d 836, 843-44
(9th Cir. 1969); United States v. Gajewski, 419 F.2d 1088, 1091 (8th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1040 (1970); Wyrough & Loser, Inc. v. Pelmor Laboratories, Inc.,
376 F.2d 543, 547 (3d Cir. 1967); Marquest Medical Prods., Inc. v. Emde Corp., 496
F. Supp. 1242, 1245-46 (D. Colo. 1980).
57. 212 U.S. 322 (1909).
58. Id. at 351. In Hammond. the Court considered the constitutionality of a state
antitrust statute and the validity of certain proceedings conducted under that statute.
Id. at 330. The statute in question created a presumption of fact as to the lack of
merit in a defense asserted by a defendant if he refused to produce evidence that he
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Advisory Committee comments to the original rules justified the effect
that the preclusive rule 37(b) sanctions have on a party's right to be
heard on the merits of a claim or defense as being consistent with the
ruling in Hammond.59 On the basis of the presumption implicit in
rule 37(b), therefore, the defendant who has failed to comply with a
jurisdictional discovery order can be treated as having waived his
right to contest the jurisdictional issue.60
The defendant may object that when jurisdictional facts are estab-
lished pursuant to rule 37(b), the plaintiff is relieved of his burden of
proving jurisdiction.6 1 Inherent in the presumption that there is a
want of merit in the defendant's claim of lack of personal jurisdic-
tion,62 however, is the further presumption that the plaintiff could
have proved the existence of jurisdiction if the information sought
through discovery had not been wrongfully withheld. 3  Further-
more, when facts are peculiarly within one party's possession, the
burden of proof or disproof of those facts is often shifted onto that
party.64 Jurisdictional facts are often within the exclusive possession
of the defendant. 65  It is not unfair, therefore, to relieve the plaintiff
was legally required to produce under that statute, id. at 353-54, and authorized the
court to strike his pleadings and render a default judgment against him in the event
of such a refusal. Id. at 341. The Court noted that the sanction was a punishment,
"'but it was only remotely so, as the generating source of the power was the right to
create a presumption flowing from the failure to produce." Id. at 351.
59. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) advisory comm. notes.
60. English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d 723, 728 n.5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 832 (1979); cf. Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir.
1976) (failure to comply with orders compelling discovery designed to assist in the
determination of factual issues constitutes a forfeiture of the right to contest those
issues); Norman v. Young, 422 F.2d 470, 473 (10th Cir. 1970) (failure to produce
business records entitles court to presume that they contain evidence that would show
the untruth or unmeritorious nature of the defense).
61. Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d 1134, 1138 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981).
62. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
63. Cf. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 63-64 (2d Cir. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1973) (court upheld default judgment, noting
that defendant had not shown anything that rendered it inconceivable that plaintiff
could have proved facts that formed the basis for award at trial); General Atomic
Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290, 308 (S.D. Cal. 1981) (court entered
sanction establishing facts lkecause party's ability to prove allegations impaired by the
absence of withheld documents); Rogers v. Chicago Park Dist., 89 F.R.D. 716, 718
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (court refused to establish facts that, even if the discovery had been
granted, plaintiff may not have been able to prove).
64. Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 96 (1961); Nader v. Allegheny
Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S.
290 (1976); Trans-Am. Van Serv., Inc. v. United States, 421 F. Supp. 308, 331 (N.D.
Tex. 1976); 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2486, at 290
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981).
65. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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of the burden of proof of those facts when the defendant has denied
him access to them .66
The defendant will seek to rebut the presumption that the failure to
respond to discovery is an attempt to conceal relevant and damaging
information.6 7 For example, he may argue that his failure to produce
the requested information is the result of the burden imposed by the
discovery. 68 By the sanction stage, however, the court has already
exercised the authority vested in it by the Federal Rules" to determine
whether the discovery sought is relevant, 70 privileged, 7' unduly bur-
densome or expensive. 72 This determination is made when the court
rules on the plaintiffs motion for an order compelling discovery.73
The court need not reconsider these factors when determining
66. A noncomplying party should not be allowed to benefit from his failure to
disclose. Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602
F.2d 1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 1979); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 231, 235 (D.C. Cir.
1977); General Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290, 308 (S.D. Cal.
1981); see Charron v. Meaux, 66 F.R.D. 64, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1975): Black v. Sheraton
Corp. of Am., 371 F. Supp. 97, 102 (D.D.C. 1974).
67. See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d
877, 891 (3d Cir.) (Gibbons, J., dissenting in part), cert. granted sub nor. Insurance
Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981).
68. Id.
69. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); id. 37(a)(2): 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 7, §
2289, at 790-91. The trial court, and not the parties, has the authority to determine
the propriety of the discovery sought. See Baker v. F. & F. Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 781
(2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 566 (1973): Fond du Lac Plaza, Inc. v. Reid,
47 F.R.D. 221, 222 (E.D. Wis. 1969); Amco Eng'g Co. v. Bud Radio, Inc., 38
F.R.D. 51, 53 (N.D. Ohio 1965). In making this determination, the court balances
the relative burdens and interests of the parties. Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522
F.2d 333, 343 (10th Cir. 1975); Richlin v. Sigma Design W., Ltd., 88 F.R.D. 634,
640 (E.D. Cal. 1980); Shenker v. Sportelli, 83 F.R.D. 365, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1979):
Flour Mills of Am., Inc. v. Pace, 75 F.R.D. 676, 680 (E.D. Okla. 1977).
70. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(1); id. 37(a)(2); see, e.g., Interstate Cigar Co. v.
Consolidated Cigar Co., 317 F.2d 744, 746 (2d Cir. 1963): Brame v. Ray Bills Fin.
Corp., 76 F.R.D. 25, 27 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
71. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1); id. 37(a)(2); see, e.g.. Transamerica Computer
Co. v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 652 (9th Cir. 1978); Baker v.
F. & F. Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 781 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied. 411 U.S. 566 (1973).
72. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); id. 37(a)(2); see, e.g.. Cockrum v. Califano, 475 F.
Supp. 1222, 1227 n.1 (D.D.C. 1979); EEOC v. Metropolitan Museum of Art, 80
F.R.D. 317, 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
73. Independent Prod. Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 30 F.R.D. 377, 380 (S.D.N.Y.
1962). A party objecting to discovery may move for a protective order, Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(c), or make a timely objection to the request. See, e.g., Perry v. Golub, 74
F.R.D. 360, 363 (N.D. Ala. 1976); United States v. 58.16 Acres of Land, 66 F.R.D.
570, 572 (E.D. Ill. 1975); Davis v. Romney, 53 F.R.D. 247, 248 (E.D. Pa. 1971). If a
protective order is not sought, the party's objections are heard with the motion to
compel the discovery. 4A J. Moore, supra note 15, 37.02[8]. at 3746. At this time
the court may enter a protective order if it finds the discovery oppressive. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 37(a)(2).
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whether to impose a sanction.74 The willfulness, bad faith or fault of
the party in connection with the failure is considered, however, in
determining which sanction to impose. 75
B. The Rules
Assertion of a federal court's jurisdiction over a non-consenting
defendant must be in accordance with rule 4 of the Federal Rules,7"
which provides for service of process. 77 If a defendant challenges the
exercise of a court's jurisdiction, there must be a factual showing that
74. See Evanson v. Union Oil Co., 85 F.R.D. 274. 277 (D. Minn. 1979), appeal
dismissed, 619 F.2d 72 (Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 832 (1980): Ohio v.
Crofters, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 12, 20 (D. Colo. 1977), af'd in relevant part sub norn.
Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
833 (1978); Independent Prod. Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 30 F.R.D. 377, 380 (S.D.N.Y.
1962); 4A J. Moore, supra note 15, 37.0215], at 37-40; 8 C. Wright & A. Miller,
supra note 7, § 2289, at 790-91. The sanctions provided by rule 37(b), including the
presumption of want of merit, are triggered by a party's mere failure to comply with
court-ordered discovery. See Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208
(1958); Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370, 1374 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory comm. note (1970 amend-
ment). The Supreme Court has agreed, however, to review a sanction order finding
personal jurisdiction for a defendant's failure to produce "extremely voluminous
records" at the offices of counsel for the plaintiff when (a) the defendants had
offered to produce those documents at their home offices abroad, (b) those docu-
ments would not have revealed that the defendants had conducted any activities in
the state, and (c) the court had made no finding that the nonresident defendants'
conduct was "willful, contumacious or in bad faith or that they were able to bring
records to district." 50 U.S.L.W. 3322 (Oct. 27, 1981) (question presented in Insur-
ance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981) (No.
81-440)). It is unclear what factors the court will consider when ruling on this
question. Arguably, factors such as the offer to produce the documents and the
contention that the documents withheld would not have revealed damaging informa-
tion should be considered before the sanction is entered as rebutting the presumption
of want of merit. The Court may, however, rule on the extent of willfulness required
before a sanction order precluding litigation can be entered. The cross-petitioners
have raised the additional issue of whether courts have the power, absent an indepen-
dent finding of jurisdiction, to order discovery and enter sanction orders for failure to
respond to that discovery. Cross Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 19, Insurance
Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981). This Issue,
however, is not directly presented by the question that the Court has agreed to hear.
75. Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1958); Cine Forty-
Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1068 (2d
Cir. 1979); Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370, 1374-75 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978); Denton v. Mr. Swiss of Mo., Inc., 564 F.2d 236,
240-41 (8th Cir. 1977); Kukuwa v. Sanchez, 498 F.2d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1974);
Dorsey v. Academy Moving & Storage, Inc., 423 F.2d 858, 860-61 (5th Cir. 1970);
Ralph E. Weeks Co. v. Kearney, 57 F.R.D. 475, 476 (M.D. Pa. 1973).
76. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)-(f).
77. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
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the requirements of rule 4 have been met. 7' For example, when a
state long-arm statute is used as the mechanism for asserting a federal
court's power under rule 4(e), 79 there must be proof that the defend-
ant has been properly served under that statute. 80 If a court enters a
rule 37(b) preclusive sanction against a defendant when proof of facts
necessary to support jurisdiction under rule 4 are not on the record,
that court appears to be using the sanction as a basis for asserting its
jurisdiction, thereby exceeding its power. s '
A court does not create its own jurisdiction, however, merely be-
cause the facts that it establishes as true pursuant to rule 37(b) are
jurisdictional . 2  Rather, the court exercises its power to determine
whether it has jurisdiction over the parties who have appeared before
it.8 3 Rule 37(b) is a means of finding the facts necessary to implement
78. See, e.g., Dejames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 287 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 642 (1981): Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A.,
629 F.2d 1134, 1139 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981): Amba Mktg.
Sys. v. Jobar Int'l, Inc., 551 F.2d 784, 787 (9th Cir. 1977).
79. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e); see supra note 24.
80. See, e.g., Forsythe v. Overmyer, 576 F.2d 779, 782 (9th Cir.), cert. denied.
439 U.S. 864 (1978); O'Hare Int'l Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173, 1177 (7th Cir.
1971); DiCesare-Engler Prods., Inc. v. Mainman Ltd., 81 F.R.D. 703, 705 (W.D.
Pa. 1979).
81. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d
877, 892 n.4 (3d Cir.) (Gibbons, J., dissenting in part). cert. granted sub non.
Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinec, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981);
Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil, S.A., 629 F.2d 1134, 1139 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981); see Read v. Ulmer, 308 F.2d 915, 917 (5th Cir. 1962):
Jurisdictional Facts, supra note 9, at 547.
82. See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d
877, 885 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub non. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981): English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d
723, 728-29 & n.5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Lekkas v. Liberian
M/V Caledonia, 443 F.2d 10, 11 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (dictum): cf. Jaconski
v. Avisun Corp., 359 F.2d 931, 935 (3d Cir. 1966) (trial judge has power to deter-
mine whether facts requisite to jurisdiction exist): Shaffer v. Coty, Inc., 183 F. Supp.
662, 665 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (court determines "'existence or non-existence of requisite
jurisdictional facts").
83. "Where adversary parties appear, a court must have the power to determine
whether or not it has jurisdiction of the person of a litigant .... " Stoll v. Gottlieb,
305 U.S. 165, 171 (1938); accord Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 882 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub non. Insurance Corp.
of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981): English v. 21st
Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d 723, 728 n.5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied. 444 U.S. 832 (1979);
Atlantic Las Olas, Inc. v. Joyner, 466 F.2d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1127 (1973); Ripperger v. A.C. Allyn & Co., 113 F.2d 332, 333 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 695 (1940); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480
F. Supp. 1138, 1151 (N.D. Ill. 1979): Moore v. Dalessio, 332 F. Supp. 926, 928 (D.
Mass. 1971); cf. United States v. UM\V, 330 U.S. 258, 290 (1947) (subject matter
jurisdiction); United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906) (same).
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the existing statutory bases of jurisdiction embodied in rule 4 when a
defendant fails to cooperate in jurisdictional discovery. 4 In Noble v.
Union River Logging Railroad,5 the Supreme Court stated that a
finding of "a preliminary fact necessary to be proven to authorize the
court to act"8 6 is "as conclusively presumed to be correct as [a] finding
with respect to any other matter in issue between the parties."87 In a
later decision, Stoll v. Gottlieb,8 s the Court included facts regarding
jurisdiction of the person in a list of examples of such preliminary
facts.89 It stated that "a mere finding [of such facts], regardless of
actual existence, is sufficient."90 The court is not exceeding its power,
therefore, when it imposes a rule 37(b) sanction establishing jurisdic-
tional facts.9'
If the requirements of the jurisdictional statute of the state in which
the federal court is located can only be met by imposing a rule 37(b)
sanction, 92 the federal court may be able to reach a party that the state
84. See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d
877, 883 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981); English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d
723, 728 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Lekkas v. Liberian M/V
Caledonia, 443 F.2d 10, 11 (4th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); cf. Mississippi Publishing
Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946) (rule 4(f) "serves only to implement the
jurisdiction over the subject matter which Congress has conferred" by providing a
procedural means of bringing the defendant before the court); Edwards v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 183 F.2d 165, 168 (5th Cir. 1950) (the rules implement the
exercise of existing jurisdiction); United States v. Krasnov, 109 F. Supp. 143, 147
(E.D. Pa. 1952) (same).
85. 147 U.S. 165 (1893).
86. Id. at 174.
87. Id. at 173 (classifying such facts as "quasi jurisdictional").
88. 305 U.S. 165 (1938).
89. Id. at 176.
90. Id. at 176-77 (emphasis added); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom
Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248, 1254 & n.20 (7th Cir. 1980) (all properly pleaded allegations of
the complaint were accepted as true for purposes of jurisdiction when defendants
failed to appear); Wood v. Santa Barbara Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 507 F.
Supp. 1128, 1136 (D. Nev. 1980) (uncontradicted facts deemed established and
determinative of jurisdiction).
91. It has been suggested that when a court, by applying rule 37(b), reaches it
party it could not otherwise reach, it is violating rule 82. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 892 n.4 (3d Cir.) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting in part), cert. granted sub nom. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981). Rule 82 prohibits construing the Federal
Rules to extend the jurisdiction of the federal district courts. Fed. R. Civ. P. 82. Rule
82 has been interpreted, however, as referring to subject matter jurisdiction and
venue and not to personal jurisdiction. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree,
326 U.S. 438, 445 (1946); Ransom v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 513, 517 n.6 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971); Lee v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 445 F. Supp. 189, 194
n.17 (D. Del. 1978).
92. This may occur when the facts necessary to support jurisdiction are within
the exclusive possession of the defendant and he refuses to allow the plaintiff to
obtain them through discovery. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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court could not. The question then arises whether application of this
rule in a diversity action violates the Rules Enabling Act,93 which
requires that the rules promulgated under it govern procedure and not
"abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."9 4  In Hanna v.
Plumer,95 the Supreme Court relied on the test outlined in Sibbach v.
Wilson & Co.96 to determine whether a federal rule was within the
scope of the Enabling Act. 97  The Court in Sibbach had stated that
"[t]he test must be whether a rule really regulates procedure-the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substan-
tive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard
or infraction of them.""6  Rule 37(b), which serves to remedy non-
compliance with court orders, 99 thereby promoting the efficiency of
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
94. Id.; see Rowe, supra note 29, at 1005-06: cf. Goldberg, supra note 29, at 434
n.224 (party not subject to state court's jurisdiction served pursuant to bulge service
provision of rule 4(f)); Federal Rule 4(J). supra note 29, at 285 (same).
95. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
96. 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
97. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464, 470-71 (1965). The question presented
in Hanna was whether process had to be served in the manner prescribed by state law
in diversity actions or whether process served in accordance with rule 4(d)(1) of the
Federal Rules was sufficient. Id. at 461. The Rules of Decision Act requires federal
courts to apply state law except when federal law otherwise requires. 28 U.S.C. §
1652 (1976). In Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), the Supreme Court,
overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), an earlier case interpreting the
Act, 304 U.S. at 79-80, held that federal courts were required to apply state deci-
sional law in diversity actions. Id. at 77-78. Later Courts refined this mandate,
finding that state law, even with respect to procedural matters, must be applied in
diversity actions whenever application of federal law would affect the outcome of the
action. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56
(1949); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). In Hanna, however,
the Court found that the Rules Enabling Act, and not the Erie doctrine, was the
appropriate standard by which to evaluate the "validity and therefore the applicabil-
ity of a Federal Rule." 380 U.S. at 469-70; Ely, supra note 21, at 718. "" *The purpose
of the Erie doctrine ... was never to bottle up federal courts with "outcome-
determinative" and "integral-relations" stoppers-when there [is) . .. a Congressio-
nal mandate (the Rules) supported by constitutional authority.' " 380 U.S. at 473
(quoting Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. \\'right, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir.
1963)). Furthermore, the Court noted that "'euery procedural variation is 'outcome
determinative,' " id. at 468, and that strict adherence to this test in evaluating the
Federal Rules would "disembowel either the Constitution's grant of power over
federal procedure or Congress' attempt to exercise that power in the Enabling Act."
Id. at 473-74.
98. 312 U.S. at 14; accord Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S.
438, 445-46 (1946); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945); Ely, supra
note 21, at 724-25; Goldberg, supra note 29, at 433; \Vesten & Lehman, Is There
Life for Erie After the Death of Dicersity?, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 311, 361 (1980).
99. See, e.g., Jones v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 602 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1979);
Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 503-05 & n.23 (4th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978).
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litigation, 00 is therefore within the scope of the Act. Furthermore, in
Hanna, the Court suggested that if a rule survived the process of being
drafted by the Advisory Committee, approved by the Supreme Court
and not vetoed by Congress, it should be presumed to meet the
requirements of the Rules Enabling Act.' 0'
Moreover, rules that affect a court's power to exercise personal
jurisdiction have been upheld as valid.102  For example, in Mississippi
Publishing Corp. v. Murphree,10 3 the Court held that the provision of
rule 4(f) 104 that authorizes service of process outside of the district in
which the federal court is located' 0 5 was within the terms of the
Enabling Act.10 6  The Court recognized that application of rule 4(f)
would "undoubtedly affect [a defendant's] rights" by requiring him to
defend in a forum that he might otherwise avoid.107  The Court
concluded, however, that because rule 4(f) "does not operate to
abridge, enlarge or modify the rules of decision by which that court
will adjudicate [his] rights," it "is not subject to the prohibition of the
Enabling Act."108 When a court uses rule 37(b) to preclude litigation
on the jurisdictional issue, it still decides the merits of the action
according to substantive state law. 0 9 Therefore, imposition of the
100. See Chism v. National Heritage Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir.
1981); Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d (52, 665 (1st Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13, 18-19 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd per curiam sub
nom. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1187 (3d
Cir. 1971).
101. 380 U.S. at 471; accord Kerney v. Fort Griffin Fandangle Ass'n, 624 F.2d
717, 720 n.5 (5th Cir. 1980).
102. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444-46 (1946) (rule
4(f); Goldberg, supra note 29, at 433 n.219; see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,
464-65 (1965) (rule 4(d)(1) prescribing manner of service); National Equip. Rental,
Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 317-18 (1964) (same): Keith v. Freiberg, 621 F.2d
318, 319 n.2 (8th Cir. 1980) (dictum) (rule 4); Ransom v. Brennan, 437 F.2d 513, 519
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 904 (1971) (rule 25(a)(1) service); Iovino v. Water-
son, 274 F.2d 41, 46, 48-49 (2d Cir. 1959) (same), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 949 (1960);
Deloro Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Engelhard Minerals & Chem. Corp., 313 F. Supp.
470, 471 n.1 (D.N.J. 1970) (bulge service); Kaplan, supra note 24, at 632 ("there is
no lack of federal power to extend the judicial jurisdiction of the district courts, in
diversity cases," by rule or statute).
103. 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
104. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
105. See supra note 25.
106. 326 U.S. at 445.
107. Id. at 446.
108. Id. (emphasis added).
109. See, e.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752-53 (1980); Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-
10 (1945); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Lester v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 433 F.2d 884, 891 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 909 (1971); Headrick
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sanction does not abridge the rules of decision by which the parties'
rights will be adjudicated. 10
The set of decisional rules to be applied, however, may vary be-
cause federal courts generally look to the choice-of-law rules of the
state in which they are located to determine which state's lw to apply
in a diversity action."' These rules may differ from state to state.1 -"
Therefore, to the extent that rule 37(b) makes it possible for an action
to be heard in one federal forum rather than another, a different
state's laws may be applied to adjudicate the action."1 3 The effect
that applying different laws to the action may have on a party's
substantive rights appears to be inconsistent with the requirement of
the Rules Enabling Act that the rules promulgated under it not
abridge substantive rights. 14
v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 182 F.2d 305, 309 (10th Cir. 1950): Shapiro, Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal. 91 Harv. L. Rev. 317, 344-55
(1977); cf. H.L. Green Co. v. MacMahon, 312 F.2d 650, 653 (2d Cir. 1962). cert.
denied, 372 U.S. 928 (1963) (when action transferred to a more convenient part of
the federal system, whatever rights the parties have acquired under state law remain
unaffected).
110. Cf. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 66 n.13 (4th Cir. 1965)
("The federal jurisdictional and venue statutes do not affect the rules of decision by
which the parties' rights will be adjudicated; they only determine the forum.").
Shapiro, supra note 109, at 344 ("[T]he availability of a federal forum will not affect
the substantive law to be applied.").
111. See Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 503 (1941); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941).
112. See P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler's
The Federal Courts and the Federal System 716 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as
Hart & Wechsler]; Cavers, Change in Choice-of-Law Thinking and Its Bearing on
the Klaxon Problem, A.L.I. Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and
Federal Courts 154, 155 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1963); "on Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 53, at 1129.
113. See Cavers, supra, note 112, at 164; Rowe, supra note 29. at 1005.06; ef.
Goldberg, supra note 29, at 434 n.224 (party not subject to state court's jurisdiction
served pursuant to bulge service provision of rule 4(f)); Federal Rule 4(f), supra note
29, at 286 (same).
114. Kaplan, supra note 24, at 633: Goldberg, supra note 29, at 434 n.225: Vestal,
Expanding the Jurisdictional Reach of the Federal Courts: These 1963 Changes in
Federal Rule 4, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1053, 1071 (1963); Federal Rule 4(f), supra note
29, at 286. A number of commentators have suggested that when an action is heard
in a federal court located in a state whose courts lack jurisdiction to hear the action,
the federal court should not be constrained to follow the state's choice-of-law rules
which, under the circumstances, the state would be powerless to employ. See, e.g.,
Cavers, supra note 112, at 156; Kaplan, supra note 24, at 633. Vestal. supra, at 1075-
76. These commentators suggest that an independent choice-of-lawv decision should
be made in such actions. Kaplan, supra note 24, at 633; Vestal, supra, at 1075-76. By
adopting an independent federal choice-of-law rule, federal courts could avoid the
effect on the defendant's substantive rights that results from requiring him to defend
in a forum that, but for the availability of rule 37(b), he might otherwise avoid.
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When the Court in Hanna suggested that the Federal Rules are
presumptively valid, 15 however, it assumed that the grant of power
embodied in the Rules Enabling Act was sufficient to sustain a com-
prehensive set of procedural rules." 6 The Court held that despite the
incidental effects that the Federal Rules might have on the resolution
of the merits of an action, they are within the scope of the Enabling
Act because they satisfy the procedural test outlined in Sibbach.t1 7
Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, questioned this deference accorded
to the federal rules by the majority," 8 suggesting a concern that a
rule, although "arguably procedural," could be applied in a manner
that abridges substantive rights." 9  Whether application of an other-
wise valid rule violates the prohibition in the Rules Enabling Act
against the abridgment of substantive rights depends on the meaning
ascribed to the term "substantive rights."12 0 Neither the Court1 2' nor
Congress 2 2 has adequately explained this term. Justice Harlan stated
that in determining whether to apply a federal rule, courts should
consider whether its application would "substantially affect . . . pri-
mary decisions respecting human conduct."'' 23  Only if a potential
defendant had made a prior decision not to respond to all discovery
requests would the possibility of being subject to the law of a different
forum because of the availability of rule 37(b) cause him to alter his
primary conduct-that is, conduct prior to litigation. 24  This specu-
lative and indirect effect of rule 37(b) is hardly the "substantial impact
115. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470-71 (1965).
116. Westen & Lehman, supra note 98, at 364; see Goldberg, supra note 29, at
441.
117. 380 U.S. at 470-71, 473-74; see supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
118. 380 U.S. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring). The presumptive validity of the
Federal Rules has also been questioned by other courts. Mississippi Publishing Corp.
v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (1946); King Resources Co. v. Phoenix Resources
Co., 651 F.2d 1349, 1,353 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 370 (1981); Grand
Bahama Petroleum Co. v. Canadian Transp. Agencies. Ltd., 450 F. Supp. 447, 450
(W.D. Wash. 1978); Central Soya Co. v. Cox Towing Corp., 417 F. Supp. 658, 662
(N.D. Miss. 1976).
119. Ely, supra note 21, at 720, 727, 729; see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 476
(1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). Section 2076 of Title 28 of the United States Code,
authorizing the Supreme Court to amend the Federal Rules of Evidence, provides
that any rules promulgated under it that create, abridge or modify a privilege shall
not become effective until approved by an act of Congress. 28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976).
This proviso demonstrates that Congress is reluctant to delegate to the Court the
power to create rules that affect substantive rights. See Rowe, supra nte 29, at 1007.
120. Westen & Lehman, supra note 98, at 361.
121. See Ely, supra note 21, at 722-23, 733.
122. Westen & Lehman, supra note 98, at 360 n.147.
123. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 475 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring); accord
Ely, supra note 21, at 724-26 & n.170.
124. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 112, at 714, distinguishing rules that tire
relevant at the primary stages of activity from those that become material after
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on private primary activity" contemplated by Justice Harlan's test. 125
The only decision that the availability of a rule 37(b) sanction directly
affects is the decision whether to respond to a specific discovery re-
quest after litigation has commenced.' 2 6  Such a decision is made
within the context of litigation and is not "primary activity."' 27
Moreover, the Court's prior analysis in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Electric
Rural Cooperative, Inc. 28 supports the application of rule 37(b) in a
diversity action when the rule operates to allow a federal court to hear
an action that the concurrent state court could not hear. The Court
indicated that federal practice should be followed in diversity actions
if that practice embodies a strong federal policy. 29 A number of
years later, in Arrowsmith v. United Press International,30 the Second
Circuit suggested that a federal court would not be required to follow
state jurisdictional law in a diversity action if a strong federal policy
litigation has commenced. Rules regarding privileges are an example of rules that
affect substantive conduct. Ely, supra note 21, at 73940. Such rules affect conduct
and relationships outside of the courtroom. See H.R. Rep. No. 650. 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 28-29, reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7075, 7097-98 (state-
ment of Rep. Holtzman).
125. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 477 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
126. See supra note 11.
127. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 112, at 747: Ely, supra note 21, at 724.25:
Westen & Lehman, supra note 98, at 361-63.
128. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
129. Id. at 538. The Court found that the strong federal policy against allowing
state rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts should prevail
over the goal of achieving uniformity of outcome among state and federal courts. Id.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on an earlier decision in which it held
that state laws could not alter the " 'essential character or function of a federal
court.' " Id. at 539 (quoting Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 2,83 U.S. 91, 94 (1931)):
see Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963): Iovino v. Waterson. 274 F.2d 41, 48
(2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 949 (1960). The Hanna decision, which
succeeded Byrd, did not mention that state and federal interests should be balanced
to determine which law to apply. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). This
has lead some commentators to suggest that the balancing approach is no longer
valid. See Ely, supra note 21, at 717 n. 130; Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the "Fact"
Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65
Mich. L. Rev. 613, 714-15 (1967). But see Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules of
Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 396-401
(1977) (proposing a refined balancing test). A number of lower courts, however, have
continued to apply Byrd. See, e.g., Walko v. Burger Chef Sys., 554 F.2d 1165, 1170
(D.C. Cir. 1977); Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527, 537 (4th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 932 (1971); McDonald v. United Airlines, Inc., 365 F.2d 593,
595 (10th Cir. 1966); Wieser v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 69 F.R.D. 97, 101 (E.D.N.Y.
1975); cf. Baron Tube Co. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 365 F.2d 858, 862 (5th Cir. 1966)
(judge-made federal rule); Chayes, Some Further Last Words on Eric: The Bead
Game, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 741, 753 (1974) (recognizing the necessity of discerning the
state and federal policies at stake in cases involving a choice between state and
federal law).
130. 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
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justified the application of a federal standard., 3' The provision of
rule 4(f) that provides for service of process on a third party found
within 100 miles of the courthouse 32 embodies such a policy.' 33  The
federal interest in providing a forum for hearing related claims that
could not otherwise be heard in one action 134 would not be served if
bulge service was only effective when the requisites for state court
jurisdiction were present.' 35 Similarly, the strong federal interests in
preventing prejudice to plaintiffs seeking discovery, 30 promoting effi-
cient litigation131 and vindicating the authority of the court 3 that
131. Id. at 227 (dictum); accord Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706, 710-
11 (4th Cir. 1966); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 64-66 (4th Cir.
1965); 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, supra note 7, § 1075, at 315; see Kaplan, supra note
24, at 631-32. The majority in Arrowsmith concluded that the Erie doctrine "'would
not prevent Congress or its rule-making delegate from authorizing a district court to
assume jurisdiction . . . in an ordinary diversity case although the state court would
not," 320 F.2d at 226, but found that "in the absence of an overriding federal interest
intimated by Congress or its delegate," state jurisdictional law should be observed.
Id. at 227. The court noted that no federal policy of similar strength or constitutional
basis as that upheld in Byrd was presented by the case before it. Id. at 230.
132. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
133. See Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 415-17 (5th Cir. 1979): Jacobs
v. Flight Extenders, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 676, 679 (E.D. Pa. 1981): Rollins v. Proctor &
Schwartz, 478 F. Supp. 1137, 1143 n.11 (D.S.C. 1979) (dictum), rev d on other
grounds, 634 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1980); Lee v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 445 F. Supp.
189, 193-94 (D. Del. 1978) (dictum); Pierce v. Globemaster Baltimore, Inc., 19
F.R.D. 63, 66-67 (D. Md. 1969); Sevits v. MeKiernan-Terry Corp., 270 F. Supp.
887, 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Kaplan, supra note 24, at 633-34; Federal Ride 4(f). supra
note 29, at 297-98.
134. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(f) advisory comm. note (1963 amendment); see Sprow v.
Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 1979); Coleman v. American Export
Isbrandtsen Lines, 405 F.2d 250, 252 (2d Cir. 1968), McGonigle v. Penn-Central
Transp. Co., 49 F.R.D. 58, 62 (D. Md. 1969); Kaplan, supra note 24, at 632; see.
e.g., UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 n.13 (1966); Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc.,
646 F.2d 716, 720 (2d Cir. 1980); Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.2d 60, 66
(4th Cir. 1965).
135. Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 1979); Coleman v.
American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, 405 F.2d 250, 251-52 (2d Cir. 1968); Lee v.
Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 445 F. Supp. 189, 193 n.15 (D. Del. 1978); Pierce v.
Globemaster Baltimore, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 63, 66-67 (D. Md. 1969); Federal Rule 4(j).
supra note 29, at 297; see Foster, supra note 20, at 20,
136. E.g., Chism v. National Heritage Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th
Cir. 1981); Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 504 & n.23 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978).
137. See, e.g., Chism v. National Heritage Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th
Cir. 1981); Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 665 (1st Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981); Philadelphia Hous. Auth. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 50 F.R.D. 13, 18-19 (E.D. Pa. 1970), afJ'd per curiain sub
nom. Mangano v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 438 F.2d 1887 (3d
Cir. 1971).
138. EEOC v. Kenosha Unified School Dist. No. 1 620 F.2d 1220, 1226 (7th Cir.
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underlie rule 37(b) justify the use of sanctions even when, by virtue of
their imposition, a federal court can assert its jurisdiction when the
state court could not. 139
C. Due Process Considerations
The Fifth Circuit has suggested that entry of rule 37(b) sanctions
against a party who is not otherwise within the court's jurisdiction
exceeds constitutional due process limitations. 40  The due process
limitations that are applicable to the federal courts are derived from
the fifth amendment.'14  An analysis of the due process requirements
of the fifth amendment, 142 however, does not support the Fifth Cir-
cuit's view. Due process limits the power of the court to exercise its
authority over a defendant. 143 A court can assert jurisdiction over
any person having a sufficient, purposeful relationship' 44 with the
forum of the sovereign that created it. 4 5 When federal court jurisdic-
1980); Perry v. Golub, 74 F.R.D. 360, 365 (N.D. Ala. 1976): Derelopments, supra
note 1, at 987.
139. Cf. Hargrave v. Oki Nursery, Inc., 646 F.2d 716. 720 (2d Cir. 1980) (federal
court in a diversity action allowed to hear claims that the state court could not hear
when those claims had a "nucleus of critical fact" common to a claim that the state
court could hear). In Hargrave. the court noted that "'Congress was certainly entitled
to conclude that the federal interest in avoiding duplicative litigation by disposing of
an entire controversy in one proceeding outweigh[s] any marginal impingement on
state concerns." Id. at 721.
140. Familia de Boom v. Arosa Mercantil. S.A.. 629 F.2d 1134, 1139 (5th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1008 (1981).
141. E.g., Dejames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 283 (3d Cir.).
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 642 (1981): Stabilisierungsfonds Fur \Vein v. Kaiser Stuhl
Wine Distribs. Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981): Honeywell, Inc. v.
Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143 (7th Cir. 1975): Volkswagen Interameri-
cana, S.A. v. Rohlsen, 360 F.2d 437, 440 n.3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 3S5 U.S. 919
(1966); Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 342 F.2d 546. 548-49 (4th Cir. 1965): lolt v.
Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354. 356-57 (W.D. Mich. 1973): Edward J.
Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381, 39U (S.D. Ohio
1967); Restatement (Second) of Judgements § 7 comment f (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978):
Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Federal Courts,
66 Cornell L. Rev. 411, 427 n.82 (1981): Foster. supra note 20, at 31.
142. U.S. Const. amend. V. The fifth amendment provides in part: "'No person
shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
143. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting); World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980): Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1878).
144. W"orld-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 444 U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980).
145. "[I]t is not the territory in which a court sits that determines the extent of its
jurisdiction, but rather the geographical limits of the unit of government of which
the court is a part." Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly. Ltd., 397 F. Supp. 287, 291 (D.
Conn. 1975); accord Centronics Data Computer Corp. v. Mannesmann, 432 F.
Supp. 659, 664 n.1 (D.N.H. 1977): Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354,
357 (W.D. Mich. 1973): Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14. 25 (E.D.
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tion is in question, the sovereign is the federal government; 10 the
forum is the entire United States. 147 Thus, as long as a defendant has
contacts with the United States, 48 the fifth amendment does not
prevent a federal court from exercising its jurisdiction over that de-
fendant. 149
Some courts have suggested that the minimum contacts limita-
tions15 0 developed in connection with the fourteenth amendment"
are constitutionally binding on the federal courts. 152 These con-
Pa. 1972); Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp.
381, 390 (S.D. Ohio 1967); see United States v. Union P.R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 603-04
(1878); Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979); Driver v. Helms,
577 F.2d 147, 156 n.25 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub norm. Stafford v.
Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974).
146. See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting):
Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979); Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d
147, 156-57 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nor. Stafford v. Briggs, 444
U.S. 527 (1980); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 11,13 (2d Cir. 1974); First Flight
Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 736-37 (E.D. Tenn. 1962);
Green, Federal Jurisdiction In Personam of Corporations and Due Process, 14 Vand.
L. Rev. 967, 969-70 (1961); Federal Rule 4(f), supra note 29, at 295. Even when an
action is brought in diversity and state law is applied, the federal government is still
the sovereign exercising jurisdiction. See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc.,
356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Cavers, supra note 112, at
156.
147. See Dejames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 292 (3d Cir.)
(Gibbons, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 642 (1981); Driver v. Helms, 577
F.2d 147, 156-57 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub noin. Stafford v. Briggs,
444 U.S. 527 (1980).
148. See, e.g., Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd., 1980-1 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 63,261, at 78,299 (9th Cir. 1980); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v.
Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1339-43 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. McAninch, 435 F.
Supp. 240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Holt v. Klosters Rederi AIS, 355 F. Supp. 354, 357
(W.D. Mich. 1973); Alco Standard Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 25 (E.D. Pa.
1972); Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & Rubber Co., 289 F. Supp. 381,
390 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
149. E.g., Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 192 (1979) (White, J., dissenting):
Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979); Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d
147, 156 n.25 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub noin. Stafford v. Briggs, 444
U.S. 527 (1980); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974); see Hart &
Wechsler, supra note 112, at 1106; Kaplan, supra note 24, at 632.
150. The "minimum contacts" test, which defines the limits of state court jurisdic-
tion, was first formulated in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945). The Court authorized suit over a nonresident defendant when that defendant
had "certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit
[did] not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Id. at 316
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
151. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "No
person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." Id.
152. Sprow v. Hartford Ins. Co., 594 F.2d 412, 416-17 (5th Cir. 1979); Honey-
well, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137, 1143 n.2 (7th Cir. 1975); Travis v.
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straints, however, serve "to ensure that the States, through their
courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their
status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system."'15 3  Fourteenth
amendment inquiry is only relevant to federal court jurisdiction when
Congress has decided, as in rule 4(e),'5 that process shall be served in
accordance with state law. 5 5 Federal courts exercising their jurisdic-
tion pursuant to such a provision follow state court jurisdictional
analysis. 56  Consideration of fourteenth amendment limitations is
then required to determine the constitutionality of the applicable state
law l5 but not the constitutional limitations on the jurisdiction of the
federal court.15  Congress's incorporation of state jurisdictional law is
discretionary, 59 not constitutionally required. 16
Anthes Imperial, Ltd., 473 F.2d 515, 529-30 (8th Cir. 1973): Coleman v. American
Export Isbrandtsen Lines, 405 F.2d 250, 252 (2d Cir. 1968).
153. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson. 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980) (em-
phasis added). These power limitations are a function of the territorial boundaries of
the states. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958): Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v.
Consejo Nacional de Producion de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247, 1251 (9th Cir. 1980):
Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 n.8 (2d Cir. 1974).
154. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
155. See Driver v. Helms, 74 F.R.D. 382, 390 (D.R.I. 1977). aff'd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), revd on other grounds
sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980): Restatement (Second) of Judge-
ments § 7 comment f (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978): von Mehren & Trautman, Tupra note
53, at 1123-25 & n.6.
156. See, e.g., Dejames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 283. 290
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 642 (1981): Vells Fargo & Co. v. W\ells Fargo
Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 418 (9th Cir. 1977); Hydraulics Unlimited Mfg. Co. v. B/
J Mfg. Co., 449 F.2d 775, 777 (10th Cir. 1971).
157. See, e.g., DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 642 (1981): Webber v. Michela, 633 F.2d 518,519 (8th
Cir. 1980); Gold Kist Inc. v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co.. 623 F.2d 375, 377 (5th
Cir. 1980); Hart & Wechsler, supra note 112, at 1119: Clermont, supra note 141, at
428 n.86.
158. See Westen & Lehman, supra note 98, at 359: supra note 149 and accompa-
nying text. Courts have noted that the federal courts' dependence on state jurisdic-
tional law in federal question cases is anomalous, Hartley v. Sioux City & New
Orleans Barge Lines, 379 F.2d 354, 356 n.2 (3d Cir. 1967): Gkiafis v. Steamship
Yiosonas, 342 F.2d 546, 549 (4th Cir. 1965): Navarro v. Sedco. Inc., 449 F. Supp.
1355, 1357 n.l (S.D. Tex. 1978), overruled on other grounds. Protean v. Sonatrach,
Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1267 (5th Cir. 1981), but have recognized that it is Congress's
role, and not the role of the courts, to rectify this situation. DeJames v. Magnificence
Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 642 (1981).
159. See, e.g., DeJames v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 642 (1981); Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d
219, 226 (2d Cir. 1963); Stern v. Gobeloff, 332 F. Supp. 909, 912 (D. Md. 1971). It is
well-established that Congress has the power to provide for service of process any-
where within the United States. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S.
438, 442 (1946); Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925): United
States v. Union P. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1878).
160. See Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 553-54 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 192 (1979) (White, J., dissenting);
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Fourteenth amendment due process also mandates consideration of
the reasonableness or fairness of requiring a nonresident to defend in a
particular forum.' 6 ' Federal courts adopting this aspect of fourteenth
amendment due process analysis to define the limitations on their own
jurisdiction,6 2 however, are imposing limitations on their power that
developed in connection with territorially limited state court jurisdic-
tion.16 3 The fifth amendment imposes no such impediment on the
reach of the federal courts with respect to parties with sufficient
contacts with the United States.18 4
Mississippi Publishing Co. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946); United States v.
Union P. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 603-04 (1878); Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser
Stuhl Wine Distribs. Pty. Ltd., 647 F.2d 200, 203 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Fitzsim-
mons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1979); A.L.I., Study of the Division of
Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts, Supporting Memorandum B 191, 194
(Official Draft 1965); Foster, supra note 20, at 38-39; see supra note 149 and
accompanying text.
161. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980): see
Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 329 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 216
(1977); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957); Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). An important consider-
ation in analyzing the reasonableness of the court's exercise of jurisdiction is whether
"the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. at 297. Implicit in the reasonableness requirement,
however, "is the understanding that the burden on the defendant, while always a
primary concern, will in an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant
factors, including the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute ... the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief ... the interstate
judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies;
and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive
social policies." Id. at 292 (citations omitted).
162. E.g., Fraley v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 397 F.2d 1, 3 (3d Cir. 1968); Lone Star
Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 212 F.2d 147, 154-55 (5th Cir. 1954); Scott
v. Middle E. Airlines Co., 240 F. Supp. 1, 3-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
163. Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distribs. Pty. Ltd., 647
F.2d 200, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 334 (7th
Cir. 1979); Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147, 156-57 (1st Cir. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527 (1980); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569
F.2d 1, 9-10 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds sub nora. Stafford v. Briggs,
444 U.S. 527 (1980); Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974); Oxford
First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191, 199-200 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Kramer v. Scientific Control Corp., 365 F. Supp. 780, 787 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Stern v.
Gobeloff, 332 F. Supp. 909, 912-13 (D. Md. 1971); First Flight Co. v. National
Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 736-37 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Abraham, Constitu-
tional Limitations upon the Territorial Reach of Federal Process, 8 Vill. L. Rev. 520,
532-35 (1963); Clermont, supra note 141, at 439; Green, supra note 146, at 986.
164. Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 553-54 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see
Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 191-92 (1979) (White, J., dissenting);
Mariash v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1143 (2d Cir. 1974). One court has determined
that the fairness component of due process relates to the fairness of the exercise of
power by a particular sovereign, not the fairness of requiring the defendant to litigate
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The fifth amendment does, however, limit the jurisdiction of fed-
eral courts over defendants who are not within the United States.165
This limitation is analogous to the fourteenth amendment limitations
imposed on the states.16 6 A defendant must have a relationship with
the United States that is sufficient to justify compelling him to comply
with the orders of its courts.167 Thus, exercise of jurisdiction over a
foreign defendant on the basis of facts established pursuant to a rule
37(b) sanction may be inconsistent with the requirements of the fifth
amendment if no such relationship exists.
It is not unconstitutional, however, to condition rights and benefits
on compliance with procedural requirements. 6 8 Federal courts im-
in a distant forum, Fitzsimmons v. Barton, 589 F.2d 330, 334 (7th Cir. 1979), and
that the latter are venue, rather than jurisdictional, concerns. Id. at 334-35: Federal
Rule 4(f, supra note 29, at 294-95. Notice and the opportunity to be heard are the
fundamental requirements of fifth amendment due process. Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950). Notice must be reasonably
calculated to inform the defendant that his rights are in issue so that he will have the
opportunity to "choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or con-
test." Id. at 314. The rules provide numerous opportunities for a party to be made
aware that his conduct in discovery is in issue. E.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d) (all motions
and notice of the hearings of such motions or affidavits supporting such motions must
be served on the other party to the suit); id. 37(a) (notice of motion for order
compelling discovery must be served on the party against whom the order is sought):
id. 55(b)(2) (notice of default must be served on a party before entry of a default
judgment against him). In addition, courts consider, among other factors, whether
the defendant has been made fully aware that his rights are in issue and has had an
adequate opportunity to object to the discovery order and to explain his failure to
comply with it before entering a sanction order against him. E.g., National Hockey
League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976) (per curiam):
Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 512 and 102 S. Ct. 641 (1981).
165. Wagman v. Astle, 380 F. Supp. 497, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Holt v. Klosters
Rederi AIS, 355 F. Supp. 354, 357 (W.D. Mich. 1973): see Foster, supra note 20, at
36.
166. See Holt v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 355 F. Supp. 354, 357 n.2 (W.D. Mich.
1973); Restatement (Second) of Judgements § 7 comment a (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1978); 2 J. Moore, supra note 15, § 4.2515], at 4-260 to -261.
167. See, e.g., Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd., 1980-1 Trade Cas.
63,261, at 78,299 (9th Cir. 1980); Engineering Equip. Co. v. S.S. Selene, 446 F.
Supp. 706, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Cryomedics, Inc. v. Spembly, Ltd., 397 F. Supp.
287, 290-92 (D. Conn. 1975); Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 37 (1971).
168. O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits trith Strings At-
tached, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 443, 445 (1966); Deterrence, supra note 5, at 1054; see
Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938); cf. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S.
395, 405-08 (1953) (first amendment rights can be regulated by requiring public
speaker to obtain license); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United States Nuclear Regu-
latory Comm'n, 555 F.2d 82, 95 (3d Cir. 1977) (opportunity to be heard in rule-
making proceedings can be conditioned on disclosure of technical information);
Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280, 286
(S.D.N.Y.), affd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980) (free communication can be restricted by
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pliedly condition the right to make an appearance for the limited
purpose of objecting to jurisdiction on cooperation in discovery di-
rected toward that issue.' 69 The mechanisms of rule 37(b) must be
available to remedy failures to comply with this condition, even when
the defendant is in the forum for a limited purpose. 70 The rule is not
unconstitutional merely because the sanction of establishing jurisdic-
tional facts may indirectly affect a foreign defendant's due process
rights by requiring him to defend the action.' 71 A regulation may
incidentally infringe constitutional rights provided that, as applied, it
has a sufficient connection with important state interests to justify the
infringement.1 72  Rule 37(b), when applied to enforce jurisdictional
discovery orders entered against foreign defendants, has a sufficient
connection with the "fundamental interests of the federal courts in the
conduct of their own business and the maintenance of the integrity of
their own procedures" 173 to outweigh its incidental effect on the con-
stitutional rights of the defendants.
II. THE APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT OF
JURISDICTIONAL DIsCovEY ORDERS
Rule 37(b) authorizes the trial judge to make such orders "as are
just" with regard to a party's failure to comply with discovery.174 The
provisions limiting coordinated contributions and expenditures under public funding
program).
169. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1151
(N.D. Ill. 1979); supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. "[A] party may be denied
access to any judicial process because he [has] failed to fulfill all the necessary
conditions for its invocation." Deterrence, supra note 5, at 1054; see Beaufort Con-
crete Co. v. Atlantic States Constr. Co., 352 F.2d 460, 462-63 (5th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 1004 (1966).
170. See supra note 43.
171. Cf. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 527 (1958) (distinguishing attempt to
protect interest within sphere of government concern, which necessarily has indirect
effect on constitutional rights, from attempt to restrict constitutional rights); Adam
v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 67-68 (1938) (treating plaintiff as having submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court for all purposes because he voluntarily appeared in the
original action).
172. French, Unconstitutional Conditions: An Analysis, 50 Geo. L.J. 234, 247
(1961); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1439, 1449 (1968); e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 377 (1968); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405-08 (1953); see Republi-
can Nat'l Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 487 F. Supp. 280, 286 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980); Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b).
173. Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 435 F.2d 527, 536 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 932 (1971).
174. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
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range of sanctions available 75 and the discretionary standard outlined
for their imposition' 76 provide the trial judge with sufficient flexibil-
ity' 77 to tailor the sanction to the particular facts in each case.'-, The
imposition of sanctions, therefore, can be consistent with the goal of
the rules to provide for the determination of cases on their individual
merits. '7 9
175. United States v. Sumitomo Marine & Fire Ins. Co.. 617 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th
Cir. 1980); Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp.. 602
F.2d 1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 1979): Griffin v. Aluminum Co. of Am.. 564 F.2d 1171,
1172 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam): Kropp v. Ziebarth, 557 F.2d 142, 146 (8th Cir.
1977).
176. E.g., Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046. 1050 (9th Cir. 1981): EEOC v. Kenosha
Unified School Dist. No. 1, 620 F.2d 1220, 1226 (7th Cir. 1980): Griffin v. Alumi-
num Co. of Am., 564 F.2d 1171, 1172 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam). In reviewing
sanction orders, appellate courts are concerned with whether the trial judge abused
his discretion in entering the order and not with whether they would have entered
the same sanction. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc.,
427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976) (per curiam): Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 231, 235 (D.C.
Cir. 1977). The district court in which the action is litigated is in a far better position
than the appellate court to determine which sanctions are appropriate. ACF Indus.,
Inc. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, 1087-88 (1979) (Powell, Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.,
dissenting from denial of cert.); Chism v. National Heritage Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d
1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1981). The standards that control the exercise of the trial court's
discretion are not altogether clear. See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insur-
ance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 884-85 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub noin.
Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981);
Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 183, 281 (1971). The%
should be related, however, to the reasons that the decision was committed to the
trial court's discretion in the first instance. United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814,
817 (3d Cir. 1981). Thus, "the fundamental [aim] of the adjudicatory process. the
purposes of discovery, the policy underlying procedure in general and discovery in
particular, . . . remedial congruence, and the possible effects of the individual sanc-
tions" on the interests of the movant and the recusant party, and its own interest in
the administration of justice should guide the court in ruling on a motion for
sanctions. Note, Discovery Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A
Goal-Oriented Mission for Rule 37(b), 29 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 603, 626 (1979)
(footnotes omitted) [hereinafter cited as Goal-Oriented Mission].
177. U.S. Judicial Conf. Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Preliminary
Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States
District Courts Relating to Deposition and Discovery (1967), reprinted in 43 F.R.D.
211, 271 (1968). See Deterrence, supra note 5, at 1050-52, for a discussion of the
importance of flexibility in administering rule 37(b).
178. Roberts v. Norden Div., United Aircraft Corp., 76 F.R.D. 75, 80 (E.D.N.Y.
1977); Perry v. Golub, 74 F.R.D. 360, 364 (N.D. Ala. 1976): see, e.g.. National
Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642-43 (1976) (per
curiam); Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602
F.2d 1062, 1068 (2d Cir. 1979); Thomas v. United States, 531 F.2d 746, 750 (5th Cir.
1976).
179. See Edgar v. Slaughter, 548 F.2d 770, 772-73 (8th Cir. 1977); McCargo v.
Hedrick, 545 F.2d 393, 396 (4th Cir. 1976): Ohio v. Crofters, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 12, 20
(D. Colo. 1977), aff'd in relevant part sub nomn. Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570
F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978).
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A. Contempt
It is well established that contempt is an appropriate sanction for a
party's failure to obey a court order when jurisdiction is unclear.,"
Fines for contempt are most effective when they are imposed on an
accruing basis until the defendant complies with the ordered discov-
ery.'"" The contempt sanction thus benefits the plaintiff by encourag-
ing the defendant to respond to his discovery request. 8 2 The plaintiff
is still faced, however, with potential prejudice resulting from the
delay prior to compliance.183
In addition, sanctioning discovery failures with contempt fines rein-
troduces the "sporting theory of justice" 84 into litigation. 8 5 Lenient
sanctions "encourage recalcitrance by litigants with something to
hide.' 8 6 By withholding vital information from the other side in
violation of a discovery order, the defendant may prevent discovery
180. Jurisdictional Facts, supra note 9, at 547-48; e.g., United States v. UMW,
330 U.S. 258, 293 (1947); United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 573 (1906): see
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 314 (1967).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 652 (9th
Cir. 1981); In re Fish & Neave, 519 F.2d 116, 119 (8th Cir. 1975); United States v.
International Bus. Machs. Corp., 60 F.R.D. 658, 667 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed,
493 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1973), appeal dismissed, 416 U.S. 976, cert. denied. 416 U.S.
995 (1974).
182. See United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 652 (9th Cir.
1981); United States v. International Bus. Machs. Corp., 60 F.R.D. 658, 665
(S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 493 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1973), appeal dismissed. 416
U.S. 976, cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974). If the sanction is imposed for civil
contempt, the punishment is remedial and for the benefit of the complainant.
Latrobe Steel Co. v. United Steelworkers, 545 F.2d 1336, 1343, 1344-45 (3d Cir.
1976).
183. See, e.g., United States v. Vetco Inc., 644 F.2d 1324, 1330 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 671 (1981); Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists
Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1068 (2d Cir. 1979); Perry v. Golub, 74 F.R.D. 360,
365 (N.D. Ala. 1976).
184. This approach to litigation was criticized by Roscoe Pound in an address to
the American Bar Association, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction vith the Ad-
ministration of Justice (Aug. 26, 1906), reprinted in 35 F.R.D. 273, 281 (1964).
"[W]e take it as a matter of course that a judge should be a mere umpire, to pass
upon objections and hold counsel to the rules of the game, and that the parties should
fight out their own game in their own way without judicial interference .... [This
approach] leads counsel to forget that they are officers of the court and to deal with
the rules of law and procedure exactly as the professional football coach with the
rules of the sport." Id.
185. Perry v. Golub, 74 F.R.D. 360, 366 (N.D. Ala. 1976); G-K Properties v.
Redevelopment Agency, 409 F. Supp. 955, 959 (N.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd, 577 F.2d 645
(9th Cir. 1978).
186. United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231, 318 (N.M.
1980), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 (1981); accord Perry v.
Golub, 74 F.R.D. 360, 367 (N.D. Ala. 1976); see National Hockey League v. Metro-
politan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (per curiam).
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not only of the information, but also of its very existence.18 - If the
defendant's motion to dismiss is granted, the plaintiff will have no
further opportunity to discover that information has been with-
held.188 Even if the existence of the withheld information is subse-
quently discovered, the defendant would merely be subject to a
fine.189 The defendant may weigh his options and find it more bene-
ficial not to produce the requested information. The rulemakers
sought to eliminate such a "sporting" approach to litigation when the)
formulated the Federal Rules.190
B. Default Judgments
The default judgment sanction, which denies the defendant his
right to be heard on the merits of the action, is too severe when
applied to enforce jurisdictional discovery. 1'' Because the jurisdic-
tional facts sought often have no bearing on the issue of liability,9 z
there is no basis for presuming that the defendant could not present a
187. Perry v. Golub, 74 F.R.D. 360, 366 (N.D. Ala. 1976); G-K Properties v.
Redevelopment Agency, 409 F. Supp. 955, 959 (N.D. Cal. 1976), affd. 577 F.2d 645
(9th Cir. 1978).
188. The jurisdictional determination is generally the threshold determination of
the action. See supra note 35.
189. Perry v. Golub, 74 F.R.D. 360, 366 (N.D. Ala. 1976); G-K Properties v.
Redevelopment Agency, 409 F. Supp. 955, 959 (N.D. Cal. 1976), a~fd. 577 F.2d 645
(9th Cir. 1978); see United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231, 315
(N.M. 1980) (applying state equivalent of rule 37(b)), appeal dismissed and cert.
denied, 451 U.S. 901 (1981). This sanction, although not employed with any degree
of regularity, does serve as a further tool for compelling compliance. Coal-Oriented
Mission, supra note 176, at 625 n. 132. One commentator has suggested that discovery
orders should not be enforced through contempt orders because a conclusive finding
on the issue in favor of the party seeking the discovery is more effective. Brautigam,
Constitutional Challenges to the Contempt Power. 60 Gceo. L.J. 1513, 1522 n.57
(1972).
190. Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602
F.2d 1062, 1063 (2d Cir. 1979); see United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S.
677, 682 (1958); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01 (1947).
191. See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d
877, 886 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nora. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981): English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d
723, 728 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); cf. Marshall v. Segona, 621
F.2d 763, 768 (5th Cir. 1980) (dismissal too severe when other party's preparation for
trial was not substantially prejudiced); Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d
494, 516, 521 (4th Cir. 1977) (default judgment too severe where absence of withheld
information did not deprive plaintiff of a fair trial), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020
(1978).
192. See Hales v. First Appalachian Corp., 494 F. Supp. 330, 332-33 (N.D. Ala.
1980); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1151 (N.D.
Ill. 1979). In addition, a court is not permitted to dispose of a case on non-jurisdic-
tional grounds until it first determines whether it has jurisdiction over the parties.
E.g., Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. Global Moving & Storage, Inc., 533 F.2d
1982]
844 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50
valid defense on the merits of the claim. 9 3  In addition, issuing a
default judgment when the defendant's appearance and failure to
comply with discovery have been limited to the jurisdictional issue
may violate due process; 194 the sanction is likely to be harsher than is
reasonably necessary 9 5 to remedy the prejudice caused by the fail-
ure 96 and to promote the efficient resolution of the litigation.'97
Furthermore, default judgment sanctions defeat the goal of the
Federal Rules to provide for the resolution of disputes on their merits
320, 323 (6th Cir. 1976); Pacific Intermountain Express Co. v. Hawaii Plastics
Corp., 528 F.2d 911, 912 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
193. Cf. Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 520-21 (4th Cir. 1977)
(default judgment inappropriate when information withheld would not have been
decisive on the issue of liability), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978); Halverson v.
Campbell Soup Co., 374 F.2d 810, 812 (7th Cir. 1967) (sanction precluding intro-
duction of evidence inappropriate when discovery was not directed at obtaining the
evidence). Courts have upheld the extreme sanctions of dismissed and default even
when the discovery withheld clearly would not have been dispositive of the issue of
liability. See Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Inmobiliaria Melia de P.R.,
Inc., 543 F.2d 3, 6 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977); Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 332 F.2d 602, 615 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 912
(1965); United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 629 P.2d 231, 316 (N.M.
1980), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 451 U.S. 901 (1981). In these cases the
discovery denied was at least relevant to the issue of liability. The facts sought
through jurisdictional discovery, however, often have no bearing on the substantive
issues in the case. See Hales v. First Appalachian Corp., 494 F. Supp. 330, 332-33
(N.D. Ala. 1980); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 1138,
1151 (N.D. Ill. 1979). Sanctions limited to the issue before the court have been
upheld. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d
877, 883-85 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981); English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590
F.2d 723, 728 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979).
194. In order to meet the due process requirement, the courts have restricted
themselves to exercising" '[t]he least possible power adequate to the end proposed.' "
Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 371 (1966) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19
U.S. 93, 105, 6 Wheat 204, 231 (1821)); accord In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227
(1945); cf. Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 Utah
L. Rev. 254, 256 (1964) (legislation).
195. DiGregorio v. First Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 789 (3d Cir. 1974)
(dictum); Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1126 (5th Cir.) (dictum),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 878 (1970); see Ohio v. Crofters, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 12, 24 (D.
Colo. 1977), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570
F.2d 1370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 833 (1978).
196. See, e.g., Marshall v. Segona, 621 F.2d 763, 768-69 (5th Cir. 1980); Wilson
v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 504 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied. 434
U.S. 1020 (1978); General Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290, 296,
307-08 (S.D. Cal. 1981).
197. See, e.g., Chira v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 634 F.2d 664, 668 (2d Cir.
1980); Edgar v. Slaughter, 548 F.2d 770, 772-73 (8th Cir. 1977). Default judgment
sanctions have been upheld, however, by courts finding that the sanction was a
necessary mechanism for deterring noncompliance by potential litigants, National
Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976) (per
curiam); Phillips v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 633 F.2d 1165, 1168 (5th Cir. 1981):
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rather than on the basis of procedural defaults. 1 8 Use of the sanction
also often fails to achieve the goal of attaining the efficient disposition
of eases. 99 Because trial judges are reluctant to preclude litigation on
the merits of a dispute,20 0 they often extend the time for compliance
with discovery orders or condition the sanction on further noncompli-
ance when confronted with a motion for a default judgment sanc-
tion. 201 Similarly, appellate court judges often reverse default judg-
ment sanctions and remand the actions for a determination on the
merits..202  Therefore, often neither the goal of promoting the effi-
ciency of the litigation, nor the goal of reaching the merits of the
dispute are achieved through sanctioning a defendant by entering a
default judgment against him.
C. Establishing the Facts
The issue-preclusive sanction of taking designated facts as estab-
lished20 3 can be tailored to remedy the specific prejudice caused to the
plaintiff by the defendant's noncompliance. -20 4 Thus, in accordance
with the requirements of due process, the means employed will be no
harsher than is reasonably necessary to achieve the purposes for which
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Inmobiliaria Melia de P.R., Inc., 543 F.2d
3, 6 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907 (1977), and for protecting the rights of
potential litigants competing for scarce judicial resources. Chism v. National Heri-
tage Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1981): Chira v. Lockheed Aircraft
Corp., 634 F.2d 664, 668 (2d Cir. 1980); Affanato v. Merrill Bros., 547 F.2d 138, 140
(1st Cir. 1977). The constitutionality of using sanctions for the purposes of benefiting
or influencing the conduct of litigants other than those involved in the litigation,
however, has been questioned. See Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d
494, 503-04 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978); Deterrence, supra
note 5, at 1052-54.
198. See, e.g., Wilson v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 561 F.2d 494, 504 (4th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1978); Affanato v. Merrill Bros., 547 F.2d 138,
140 (1st Cir. 1977); Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669, 670 (2d Cir. 1957).
199. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
200. E.g., Chira v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 634 F.2d 664, 668 (2d Cir. 1980);
Affanato v. Merrill Bros., 547 F.2d 138, 140 (1st Cir. 1977); Pioche Mines Consol.,
Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 257, 270 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denicd, 380 U.S. 956
(1965); W. Glaser, Pretrial Discovery and the Adversary System 185 (1968);
Kaminsky, supra note 4, at 984; Renfrew, supra note 5, at 277.
201. W. Glaser, supra note 200, at 155; Developments, supra note 1, at 991.
202. Werner, Survey of Discovery Sanctions, 1979 Ariz. St. L. Rev. 299, 317; see
Waterman, An Appellate Judge's Approach When Reviewing District Court Sanc-
tions Imposed for the Purpose of Insuring Compliance with Pre-trial Orders, 29
F.R.D. 420, 424-25 (1961).
203. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A).
204. English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d 723, 728-29 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 832 (1979); General Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290, 308-
09 (S.D. Cal. 1981); see, e.g., Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of
N. Am., 651 F.2d 877, 885-86 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub non. Insurance Corp. of
Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981); Puerto Rico v. SS
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the sanction is imposed. 20 5 By precluding litigation on the issue, the
court even eliminates the benefit that the defendant may have gained
through delaying discovery2 6 and thus causing the plaintiff to be
inadequately prepared at trial .207
The issue-preclusive sanctions are particularly effective when juris-
dictional information has been withheld .2 0  One of the purposes of
rule 37(b) is to move litigation from its frozen state when party-
controlled discovery has broken down.2 0 9 Until jurisdiction over the
parties is established, a court normally will not hear the merits of the
action.210  By precluding litigation on the jurisdictional issue, the
court can proceed to the merits of the dispute despite the defendant's
failure to comply with jurisdictional discovery.21' This sanction thus
furthers the aim of the Federal Rules to adjudicate claims on their
merits.
CONCLUSION
Effective discovery sanctions are essential to the fair and efficient
administration of the judicial process. If courts do not employ the
sanctions outlined in rule 37(b) to enforce jurisdictional discovery,
defendants could paralyze litigation by raising jurisdictional objec-
tions and then refusing to provide the court with sufficient informa-
tion to rule on the validity of those objections. Plaintiffs without a
Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 666 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981); Rogers v. Chicago Park Dist., 89 F.R.D. 716, 718-19 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
205. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d
877, 886 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981); English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d
723, 728 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979).
206. Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602
F.2d 1062, 1066 (2d Cir. 1979); Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 231, 235 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
207. General Atomic Co. v. Exxon Nuclear Co., 90 F.R.D. 290, 308 (S.D. Cal.
1981); see Jones v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 602 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1979); Rogers
v. Chicago Park Dist., 89 F.R.D. 716, 719 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
208. See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d
877, 886 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des
Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981); English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590 F.2d
723, 728 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979).
209. Goal-Oriented Mission, supra note 176, at 627; see Dependahl v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 512 and 102
S. Ct. 641 (1981); Chism v. National Heritage Life Ins. Co., 637 F.2d 1328, 1332
(9th Cir. 1981); Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures
Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1068 (2d Cir. 1979).
210. See supra note 34.
211. See Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d
877, 880, 887 (3d Cir.), cert. granted sub nor. Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie
des Bauxites de Guinee, 102 S. Ct. 502 (1981); English v. 21st Phoenix Corp., 590
F.2d 723, 727 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979).
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viable alternative forum would be denied an opportunity to present
their claims. The defendant has the opportunity to show that jurisdic-
tion is lacking. His refusal to produce information relevant to his
defense strongly suggests that the information withheld is damaging to
his case. The rule 37(b) sanction of establishing jurisdictional facts is a
fair and effective means of remedying this abuse without subverting
the fundamental goal of the judicial process to provide for a fair
hearing on the merits of every action.
Sarah C. Murphy
